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Introduction 
The task of this paper is to outline the main currents of thought that have influenced recent 
literature on strategic culture. While some analyses use strategic culture without necessarily 
specifying intended meaning, others are seeking to make the study of strategic culture more 
rigorous in conceptual and policy relevant terms.  
The modern understanding of strategic culture emerged during the East-West Cold War and the 
immediate period following its denouement. In the western world the texts written in a period from 
the mid-1970s until the end of 1990s provide an invaluable archive of thinking about how 
continuity and change influence strategic culture, and what factors should be deemed the most 
important.  
The point of emphasizing the emergence of the modern pantheon of strategic culture is a 
contextual one. The world underwent profound transformation in the early part of the twentieth 
century with major wars occurring in Europe that had global ramifications. Later, the Cold War 
and the advent of the nuclear revolution brought to the fore important writings on 
realism/neorealism and strategic culture. The Cold War ended without conflict, a major outcome 
in human history. What can the writings of this period and subsequently inform us of the world we 
now confront? This question represents the starting position for this paper; and although the 
focus will be on developments in strategic culture research the impact that realist/neorealist 
thought continues to have provides a backdrop to this analysis.  
The first observation of recent (and much previous) work is that several writers on strategic 
culture are seeking to develop a richer account of the international environment than the one 
derived from neorealism. It seeks to accomplish this by emphasizing the domestic cultural context 
in influencing strategic outcomes. Rather than interpreting behavior solely as a result of 
constraints and opportunities imposed by the material environment, strategic culture analysts 
wish to reassert the importance of cultural, ideational, and normative influences on the 
motivations of states and their leaders. Equally, many also accept that to analyze strategy purely 
from a cultural position would be inappropriate. Instead, the objective is to explore the range of 
cultural conditions, which shape the perception strategists have of material conditions.[1] 
Another observation of recent literature is noteworthy. While questions still remain for those 
interested in developing a strategic culture research program efforts are underway to: assess the 
knowledge gleaned from using both neorealist and strategic culture analyses; develop a more 
dynamic understanding of culture and consider how this influences strategic outcomes; and, 
although still rare, compare strategic cultures in a regional and cross-regional setting. At the 
same time definitional issues have not disappeared and new questions have emerged. Can a 
research framework be applied to entities that are not states, and what implications do 
globalization and the Internet have for our understanding of strategic culture? In the post-9/11 
world this has policy relevance as analysts are confronted with a conundrum: is it appropriate to 
apply a strategic culture framework to transnational non-state terrorist networks like al Qaeda or 
can it be used only for states operating within defined territorial boundaries? Similarly, what 
implications does this have for regional actors comprising several states like the European Union 
(EU)?  
Developing a consensus on issues such as definition may be important if a coherent research 
program is to flourish although this should not necessarily preclude collaborative research. Can a 
definition of strategic culture be found that is acceptable to all? At stake is whether there is a core 
concept of strategic culture that is generally accepted but still gives rise to dispute about 
particular interpretations; or whether there is no agreement about an underlying concept and 
consequently what we are left with is competing conceptions? But even if there was no 
agreement about an underlying concept there may be possibilities to engage in an enterprise 
intended to establish "middle range" theoretical and policy relevant knowledge. This is 
understood as theories that "provide conceptualization and contextualization of issues and cases, 
trace policy processes, and explain consequences of policy choices."[2]  
Consequently, this research would seek to identify “common ground” whereby even those from 
different conceptual and disciplinary orientations collaborate across boundaries in the spirit of 
developing what Alexander George and Andrew Bennett refer to as "generic knowledge."[3] Such 
knowledge "is most useful when it identifies conditions, processes, and causal mechanisms that 
link the use of each strategy to variance in its outcomes."[4] 
Surveying Recent Literature: Trends and Issues  
One reason why strategic culture is often criticized is because of the diversity of definitions that 
have been used by analysts and the difficulties this has generated for knowledge building. Some 
writers have adopted a narrow military definition linking it to traditional strategic criteria for 
considering various possible courses of action to attain a specific objective or qualify this by 
considering strategic culture only as it applies to the nuclear realm. Additionally, others have 
preferred to focus on the grand strategies of states and include aspects such as economics and 
diplomatic ways of attaining a state’s objectives in addition to military ones.  
There have also been three main approaches to the study of the strategic culture of particular 
states. The first views strategic culture in terms of its capacity to add greater historical and 
cultural detail of developments operating within the state but are seeking only to supplement 
material based analyses centered on interest and the distribution of power. Strategic culture is 
here understood as a variable that may influence behavior but is regarded as having secondary 
significance to the material structure.  
A second approach is seeking to provide an alternative basis for knowledge of strategic cultures 
by constructing a methodology that is falsifiable and leads to cumulative research, which can be 
used for future prediction. This view considers strategic culture to be "an independent variable 
and behavior as a dependent variable, and pitting the culturalist explanation of behavior against 
alternative explanations, such as realist and institutionalist ones."[5] 
Finally, there are those who consider that aspects of human conduct can be understood only by 
becoming immersed within a culture and consequently the search for falsifiable general 
statements is unachievable. The objective of this approach is to understand the meanings of both 
discursive and non-discursive expressions. From this perspective what is unsaid may be as 
important as verbal statements and non-discursive gestures may be as significant as written 
evidence. These assumptions led earlier writers to try and understand rather than explain various 
cultures: that is, to understand what actors meant by their actions. The task was therefore to 
locate such action within the cultural "form of life" the actor was immersed in.[6] 
Re cent analyses have also attempted to both improve on the definitional aspect of strategic 
culture and consider research frameworks that can be applied at the comparative regional level. 
In a study of strategic culture in the Nordic region, for example, the author’s approached strategic 
culture as a "transnationally nested dynamic interplay between grand strategic discourse and 
strategic practices."[7] Elsewhere in that volume it is suggested that strategic culture focuses on:  
the nexus between the political or strategic and the military or operational dimensions of 
strategy. The approach is basically an argument for taking a holistic approach to 
questions of strategy by arguing that they cannot merely be reduced to technical 
questions (e.g. how to conduct a successful campaign) or reduced to 'a continuation of 
political intercourse with addition of other means’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 605). Military 
matters constitute a practice in their own right that cannot be reduced to the political 
purpose for which armed force is deployed; but, on the other hand, this practice cannot 
be regarded independently of the political rationales of the security policy of which the 
armed forces are a part.[8] 
This study of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden represents a significant collaborative 
venture between the states in the Nordic region. The analyses reveal many of the traditionally 
associated sources of strategic culture but is noteworthy also as it was written during changing 
times: that is, the post-Cold War, post-9/11 international environment. Each of the case studies 
observed changes in the strategic cultures of their respective countries as a result of these events.  
Comparative studies of this kind are still relative few. Most concentrate on individual country 
studies without making regional or cross-regional comparisons. There may be important reasons 
for this. One concerns the complexity of this type of analysis as the frames of reference for each 
case study may be different – the analyses may be comparing like with unlike. Another reason 
relates to a question common to regional analyses in general: what is the region for the purposes 
of study? There are several ways of defining a region including by geography, by cultural affinity, 
by institutional arrangement or by security complex.[9] Determining which states are to be 
included has impacted on security and arms control dialogues in the past and also affects 
regional and cross-regional analyses of strategic culture.  
In their analysis of an emerging EU strategic culture, Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards adopt a 
definition related to the institutional identity of the regional actor and the processes by which it 
uses military force. Consequently, they define strategic culture as:  
the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, 
coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere…[10] 
Cornish and Edwards also highlight the post-9/11 environment as representative of a change in 
policy orientation. Hence, they point to the EU’s "capacity and confidence to use military force 
and non-military coercion as policy tools" in the face of new threats, especially the "post-9/11 
campaign against international terrorism’, which has 'constituted a vitally important area of 
operation…"[11] 
Analysts have also been considering changes occurring in other parts of the world and whether 
international structural factors stemming from neorealist theorizing or insights derived from 
strategic culture research provide the most appropriate means for conceptualizing these changes. 
Studies of Japan, for example, have focused on the nature of its security policy between 1945 
and1989, and the period since the end of the Cold War.[12] By testing this country’s security 
policy with "a constructivist theory of antimilitarism and a realist theory of buck-passing," Jennifer 
Lind seeks to provide "better foundations for predictions about future Japanese policy."[13] Lind 
considers there have been misunderstandings in assessing Japan’s security policy and that this 
has both theoretical and policy implications as it concerns: underestimations of the level of 
Japan’s military power, especially sea control capabilities; the inability of domestic norms of 
restraint to inhibit changes in security policy; and the role of a "buck-passing" strategy in 
explaining the evolution of the military transformation that has occurred.[14] 
The Sources of Strategic Culture 
Much has been written previously on the sources of strategic culture but it is worthwhile to 
reconsider such factors, as there have been variations within and between studies. Several 
sources of strategic culture have been identified encompassing both material and ideational 
factors. Those most frequently cited are: geography, climate and resources; history and 
experience; political structure; the nature of organizations involved in defense; myths and 
symbols; key texts that inform actors of appropriate strategic action; and transnational norms, 
generational change and the role of technology.  
This list alludes to the complexities associated with strategic culture research. Each of the most 
frequently cited sources is significant in its own right and may have a range of differing 
understandings and explanations associated with it. This has implications for attempts at theory 
building as judgment needs to be made about what are the most important factors to be studied 
and when and how do they influence strategic culture? Additionally, should these be ranked or 
will it be variable across case studies, regions and the actors involved?  
The significance of geography, climate and resources has been a key element in strategic 
thinking throughout the millennia and remain important sources of strategic culture in the current 
era. For many, geographical circumstance is the key to understanding why some countries adopt 
particular strategic policies rather than others. For example, proximity or otherwise to great 
powers has been viewed as an important factor, as the examples of Norway and Finland 
exemplified during the Cold War and in previous eras.[15] Additionally, many territorial borders 
are settled by negotiation but others have been forged through conflict and in several parts of the 
world they are still contested. Some states have multiple borders and may be confronted by 
different strategic factors at each point of contact with neighboring states: that is, they could have 
to respond to multiple security dilemmas. Equally, ensuring access to vital resources is an 
enduring aspect that many view as a significant motivating factor in their strategic considerations. 
Geographic factors in the context of a changing global territorial and resource landscape 
consequently continue to exert influence on the makers of strategic policy in the 21st century.  
History and experience are also deemed important considerations in the birth and evolution of 
states, and the strategic cultural identities that comprise them. This presents the analysts of 
strategic culture with a question: what type of state are you dealing with? International Relations 
theory has identified several kinds of states ranging from weak to strong, colonial to post-colonial, 
and pre-modern, modern and postmodern.[16] This raises the prospect that different kinds of 
states may confront different strategic problems and with varying material and ideational 
resources, apply unique responses.[17] For newly-formed states the difficulties of nation-building 
can compound insecurities and become an important generator of strategic cultural identities. 
This is not related just to what may be hostile neighbors either acting individually or in concert 
with others (potentially over disputed territories), but also as a result of other cultural groupings 
operating from within and beyond these borders. Conversely, for those states of ancient standing 
the longevity of their existence may have awoken consecutive leaders to the conditions and 
contexts that give rise to the rise and fall of great powers or civilizations and adopt policies to suit.  
This observation provokes the question of what should be the historical starting point for research 
because this also varies between studies. Some take the long view by tracing particular factors 
that have influenced strategic cultural identities over time, possible millennia. Others adopt a 
more limited timeframe and focus on recent events that have transformed strategic cultural 
identities such as conflict or other catastrophic incursions. In this context, the end of the East-
West Cold War and the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and in other parts of 
the world subsequently have raised new questions about the emerging strategic environment and 
the policy responses necessary both now and in the future.  
Another source of strategic culture is the nature of a country’s political structure and those 
organizations involved in defense. An earlier study highlighted the following questions in this 
context:  
What traditionally have been the most important features of the country’s political system? Has it 
been liberal-democratic or communist, centralized or decentralized, open or closed, pluralist or 
dominated by narrow elites? Is there a tradition of stability or instability? Has the system 
undergone any radical change? Has public opinion had much of a role to play in policy-making? 
Have the armed forces involved themselves in politics? Can any generalizations be made about 
the type of polity and its military behavior?[ 18] 
These questions raise significant issues for the analyst of strategic culture as political structures 
have taken various forms throughout the world. Some adopt a broadly Western liberal democratic 
style of government others do not. Some are considered mature democracies while others are 
undergoing democratic transformation and are in various stages of consolidation. Where the latter 
are concerned there may be cultural variables such as tribal, religious or ethnic allegiances that 
operate within and across territorial boundaries, which determine the pace and depth of 
consolidation.  
Similarly, many regard defense organizations as being critical to strategic cultures but differ over 
the precise impact these have. Studies of the Nordic region have revealed that issues such as 
whether the forces are professional or conscript and their experiences in conflict are significant. 
Emphasis was also placed on the role of doctrinal, civil-military relations and procurement 
practices. For example, when focusing on previous debates concerning doctrines in grand 
strategy, two central insights are made:  
The first is that both civil and military logics make it unlikely for any concept of 'grand strategy’ to 
be applied in its entirety. The other insight is that any 'grand strategy’ worthy of its name must not 
be allowed to develop in continuation of tactics and strategy, as a purely military pursuit, but must 
on the other hand be explicated on the basis of general, political goals.[19] 
Similarly, where civil-military relations are concerned, it is argued the debate is not so much about 
military doctrines, "but the preconditions for the deployment and the kind of rationality that is at 
stake in those deployments."[20] 
Myths and symbols are considered be part of all cultural groupings. Both are viewed as relevant 
as these can act as a stabilizing or destabilizing factor in the evolution of strategic cultural 
identities. The notion of "myth" can have meaning different from the traditional understanding as 
something "unfounded or false."[21] John Calvert writes that it can also refer to:  
A body of beliefs that express the fundamental, largely unconscious or assumed political values 
of a society—in short, as a dramatic expression of ideology. The details narrated in a political 
myth may be true or false; most often they meld truth and fiction in ways that are difficult to 
distinguish. What is important, however, is that the myth’s narrative element are perceived and 
embraced as true. To be effective, political myth must engage not reason, but belief and faith.[22] 
Work on symbols has also suggested that these act as "socially recognized objects of more or 
less common understanding" and which provide a cultural community with stable points of 
reference for strategic thought and action.[23] 
Many analysts regard key texts as important in informing actors of appropriate strategic thought 
and action. Traditional analyses of peace and conflict have long pointed to the influence of such 
texts throughout history and in different cultural settings. These may follow a historical trajectory 
from Sun Tzu, who was considered to have written the Art of War during the time of the warring 
states in ancient China, through the writings of Kautilya in ancient India, and into western 
understanding as a result of Thucydides commentary on the Peloponnesian Wars and 
Clausewitz’s writings on the nature of war as a result of observations of the Napoleonic period. 
Concomitantly, writers on strategic culture have identified other sources of knowledge that may 
be in competition with these writings. Studies of particular countries have observed the oscillating 
influence of two distinct strategic traditions. In a study of Greece the author identified this as 
operating between the followers of Achilles and those who revere Odysseus. On the one hand 
there are the 'traditionalists’, who derive their intellectual sustenance from the exploits of Achilles, 
hero of the Iliad, and who view the world as an anarchic arena where power is the ultimate 
guarantee of security. On the other hand there are the 'modernists’, followers of Odysseus the 
hero of Homer’s epic poem, Odyssey, who although viewing the world as an anarchic 
environment consider that Greece’s best strategy is to adopt a multilateral cooperative approach 
to peace and security.[24] This is a dualism in strategic culture that reflects the influence of long 
held myths and legends, which continue to find resonance in the modern era.  
Analyses of Sweden and Denmark have also revealed two forms of strategic culture. In the case 
of Sweden the first form emphasizes professional and technologically advanced forces for its 
military, while the second revolves around notions of a people’s army based on conscription and 
the democratic involvement of citizens of the state.[25] Where Denmark is concerned the two 
forms have been labeled cosmopolitanism and defencism. Cosmopolitanism stresses neutrality, 
alternative non-military means of conflict resolution and the importance of international institutions 
such as the former League of Nations and the United Nations. In contrast, defencism emphasizes 
the importance of military preparedness encapsulated in the dictum ‘if you want peace, you must 
prepare for war’ and the importance of regional military organizations, such as NATO, in 
defending the country and deterring would be aggressors. After the Second World War, a 
compromise was reached between these two alternative perspectives under a policy of 
"deterrence" based on the principle of a strong defence bolstered by membership of NATO.[26] 
Finally, transnational norms, generational change and technology are also regarded as important 
sources of strategic culture. Transnational norms are said to define 'the purpose and possibilities 
of military change’ and in providing guidance concerning the use of force.[27] Theo Farrell has 
considered how transnational norms (in his case, those relating to military professionalism), have 
influenced national norms and the process by which this occurs.[28] Farrell considers that 
transnational norms can be transplanted into a country’s cultural context either through a process 
involving pressure on a target community to accept the new norms (termed "political 
mobilization"), or by a process of voluntary adoption (termed "social learning"). Norm 
transplantation, as Farrell refers to it, can thus occur via a process of incremental adoption over 
time eventually achieving a cultural match between the transnational and national norms.  
Conversely, such a process of transplantation can occur through radical means, which induces 
major cultural change within a specific community. Radical norm transplantation may be 
generated in three ways: the first is by an "external shock to the local cultural system—in the form 
of wars, depression and revolutions;" the second is by "norm entrepreneurs," individuals who, the 
closer they are "to the decision-making apparatus of the target community, the better they will be 
able to communicate and push through new ideas;" and the third is through ‘personnel change’ 
such that innovative thinkers gain access to influential positions and are able to introduce new 
ideas to the policy-making process.  
Both generational change and technology, particularly information and communications 
technology (ICT), can have important ramifications for issues of empowerment and strategic 
reach. The arrival of the Internet is a relatively recent phenomenon yet there are now generations 
who have grown up with this medium of information and communication. This is also a world of 
individual and group empowerment that is both global in scope and potentially unique in its 
implications as a dual use technology. While ICT has transformed societies, it has also allowed 
indivi duals or groups to communicate in novel ways and cause disruption at a distance.  
Are strategic cultures immutable or do they change over time ?  
Some strategic culture research has been criticized for adopting an essentialist conception of 
culture that assumed coherent cultural entities with clearly defined boundaries largely 
impermeable to change. This research is also said to have adopted a deterministic view of the 
relationship between culture and behavior making it difficult to assess the causal relevance of 
strategic culture.[29] This is a complex issue, as it raises the question of how to understand the 
dynamic relationship between cultural identities, different types of behavior and strategic 
outcomes. As one writer has commented:  
Cultures can never really be described in their entirety, partly because they are too complex and 
dynamic. In practice, seeing through the cultural maze requires the identification of cultural 
totems: the images, meanings, norms, values, stories, and practices that seem particularly 
significant in determining what political or social life looks like….Culture can help us understand 
why humans act the way they do, and what similarities and differences exist among them.[30] 
Recent analysis has started to utilize developments in sociological and anthropological theory to 
provide a more dynamic understanding of culture. This work seeks to challenge 'the distinction 
between behavior and culture’ by considering "culture as practice."[31] 
Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka consider that previous work on strategic culture has been 
using an outdated and reified concept of culture. This, they argue, has consequences for 
research as, "the literature on strategic culture does not (yet) give us the kind of dynamic and 
specific framework for empirical analysis that we need."[32] Using the work of writers on practice 
theory, Neumann and Heikka seek to develop such a framework whereby "practice and discourse 
constitute a culture."[33] Discourse is understood as "a system for the formation of statements" 
(quoting Jens Bartelson), whereas practice is taken to be "socially recognized forms of activity, 
done on the basis of what members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, 
correctly or incorrectly" (quoting Barry Barnes).[34] 
Neumann and Heikka apply this notion of culture to the strategic realm by considering its use in 
the context of grand strategy, which they argue is also in need of disaggregation.[35] Their 
intention is to accomplish this "by reconceptualizing 'grand strategy’ from being a coverall term on 
a par with strategic culture, to being a coverall term for all preconditions for action."[36]Grand 
strategy, thus reformulated is understood as, "a set of preconditions for action, at a specific time, 
in a specific place, that may exist in more or less explicit and systematized form, and that is 
actualized in practices."[37] Neumann and Heikka acknowledge that at this stage the model "still 
treats culture as a clearly bound and homogeneous phenomenon," so they augment it "in such a 
way that strategic culture emerges not as the stable product of a homogeneous process inside a 
clearly limited nation-state, but rather as an unstable compromise of a contested transnational 
type."[38] 
In the same volume, Mikkel Vedby Rassmussen writes that this reconceptualization has 
significance for analyses of strategic cultures of states other than great powers:  
Practice theory makes it possible to study how changes in the international order not only give a 
minor power like Denmark new possibilities for action but how these possibilities for action 
influence and are influenced by existing discourse on the country’s place in the world. 
Responding to the end of the Cold War is not just a matter of how Denmark uses new possibilities 
given by structural conditions, but also a matter of how Denmark establishes a practice for using 
them. New possibilities for action are thus not only opportunities which states automatically 
utilizes, but rather shocks that, using Ann Swidler’s term, 'unsettle’ the existing culture. In such 
unsettled periods, practice and discourse are unhinged because they no longer co-constitute a 
culture but rather challenge one another. The result can be a new culture, but the existing one 
can also settle in a new pattern in which the relationships between discourses are redefined to fit 
a new practice.[39] 
Can transnational actors have strategic cultures?  
Can a research framework be applied to anything that is not a state and what implications do 
globalization and the Internet have for our understanding of strategic culture? It was noted earlier 
that some consider there is an evolving EU strategic culture operating at the regional level: but 
can this apply to non-state actors operating across territorial boundaries where identities may be 
formed in the realms of both physical and cyberspace.  
The advent of the cyber revolution has generated several issues concerning our understanding of 
conflict and security.[40] Emily Goldman writes that threats to cyberspace, "range from the 
systematic and persistent, to the decentralized and dispersed, to the accidental and non-
malevolent."[41] Additionally, while acknowledging that the technologies associated with 
globalization have enable terrorist groups to conduct operations that "are deadlier, more 
distributed, and more difficult to combat than those of their predecessors," James Kiras argues 
that these same technologies "can be harnessed to defeat terrorism by those governments with 
the will and resources to combat it."[42] 
At the turn of the millennium Victor Cha identified what he termed a "globalization-security’ 
spectrum.[43] At one end of this spectrum Cha placed grand strategic options related to the 
ending of the East-West rivalry, because these were derived 'from the end of bipolar competition 
rather than from globalization." At the other end were those aspects derived from globalization’s 
security effects, which had heightened "the salience of substate extremist groups or 
fundamentalist groups because their ability to organize transnationally, meet virtually, and utilize 
terrorist tactics has been substantially enhanced by the globalization of technology and 
information."[44] As Cha encapsulated it: 
The most far-reaching security effect of globalization is its complication of the basic concept of 
'threat’ in international relations. This is in terms of both agency and scope. Agents of threat can 
be states but can also be non-state groups or individuals.[45] 
Thus for Cha, the advent of "instantaneous communication and transportation, exchanges of 
information and technology, flow of capital—catalyze certain dangerous phenomena or empower 
certain groups in ways unimagined previously."[46] 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have also argued that "the information revolution is altering the 
nature of conflict across the spectrum."[47] They identify two related developments, which 
concern both changes to organizational structures and how we understand conflict. As they 
characterize the situation: first, "network forms of organization" now have the advantage "over 
hierarchical forms; and second, as this 'revolution deepens, the conduct and outcome of conflicts 
increasingly depend on information and communication."[48] Consequently, they consider that, 
"information-age threats are likely to be more diffuse, dispersed, multi-dimensional nonlinear, and 
ambiguous than industrial-age threats."[49] 
Some have noted the possible parallels between traditional types of terrorism and those relating 
to cyberspace, including, "the diversity of actors involved, the reliance of at least some of them on 
networks, the broad range of motivations, the anonymity of the perpetrators of terrorist 
incidents….and the enormous array of potential targets and weapons."[50] 
Do these developments imply that transnational non-state terrorist actors can have a strategic 
culture? This could depend on the approach to strategic culture adopted. If the approach 
considers that strategic cultures apply to actors that have a material basis, especially a defined 
territory, then only states could be included in the framework. Conversely, if ideational factors 
such as myths and symbols are deemed important and that these gain significance 
transnationally and via new communication modes such as cyberspace, then this approach could 
encompass such actors. Additionally, this also resonates with the issue of whether terrorist 
groups should be treated as armed bands. As Joseph McMillan comments:  
The trend in the United States since 9/11 has increasingly been to view terrorists more as armed 
enemies and less as criminals – in other words, to treat them primarily as an opposing armed 
force, albeit an unlawful one. The word 'primarily' is important, because the two approaches are 
not mutually exclusive. In fact, Abraham D. Sofaer and Paul R. Williams have aptly described 
terrorism as 'unconventional warfare conducted by unprivileged combatants with the assistance 
of criminal co-conspirators designed primarily to terrorize and kill civilians.' The question is 
whether that approach is appropriate and justified. In answering that question, two criteria have to 
be considered. The first is definitional: is the term 'armed force' applicable to terrorist groups in 
general or only to one terrorist groups in particular? The second is utilitarian: is treating terrorist 
groups as armed forces strategically useful?[51] 
Strategic culture: developing a framework for the future?  
Works on strategic culture have not been that numerous in recent years, yet those that have been 
produced offer suggestions in overcoming some of the problems identified with this kind of 
analysis. This body of work is seeking to develop greater theoretical precision to allow for the 
possibility of gaining insights into the future strategic realm. It has also embraced developments 
in other disciplines and while such analysis could be charged with becoming more eclectic, this 
can also be interpreted as a positive virtue. There is research strength in developing an approach 
to strategic culture that allows for the accumulation of inter-disciplinary knowledge in individual 
country, regional, cross-regional and transnational settings.  
Much research still needs to be done to provide detailed studies of strategic cultures for the 
purposes of comparative case studies. At the same time, one caveat is that in seeking to identify 
causal relations there is a risk of over-simplifying the social world and consequently categories 
from one case may be applied inappropriately to others. An inadequate knowledge of a given 
strategic culture may lead to the misinterpretation of the various attributes of notions such as 
pride, honor, duty and also security and stability.  
One method that may allow for cumulative research is process tracing, which involves 
"theoretically informed historical research to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to an 
outcome."[52] As George and Bennett have outlined:  
process-tracing is one means of attempting to get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations 
behind observed phenomena. Process-tracing attempts to empirically establish the posited 
intervening variables and implication that should be true in a case if a particular explanation of 
that case is true. Theories or models of causal mechanisms must undergird each step of a 
hypothesized causal process for the process to constitute a historical explanation of the case’.[53] 
The task for the researcher is to trace the processes that could have generated a strategic 
outcome in particular case studies. This method will produce several observations within each 
case, which "must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case."[54] 
Another theoretical move that George and Bennett advocate is "the development of contingent 
generalizations about combinations or configurations of variables that constitute theoretical 
types…"[55] Typological theorizing as they refer to it "allows for cross-case comparisons/studies 
which can be integrated with within-case methods to allow structured iterations between theories 
and cases."[56] The "hallmark of a fruitful and cumulative typological theory is the refinement of 
contingent generalizations that differentiate both independent and dependent variables in ways 
that produce increasingly close similarity of cases within each type, as well as sharper distinctions 
between types."[57] 
Considering strategic culture as "a dynamic interplay between discourse and practice" also offers 
a means for accommodating the issue of the mutable nature of strategic culture. Similarly, it could 
illuminate both how strategic culture evolves from generation to generation and is transformed by 
competing groups through negotiation and debate. Studies outlined in this paper have also 
identified that at least two strategic cultures within a state historically compete with each other for 
dominance. An emphasis on discourse and practice could illuminate when, how and why one 
form of strategic culture challenges another during critical periods of a state’s history. Often, both 
generational change and paradigm competition go hand in hand so that the older generation 
maintains its faith in the dominant strategic culture while the new generation adopts the opposing 
form.[58] 
In order to gain a better insight into the nature of any one state’s strategic culture and what 
influences continuity and change may thus require a combination of analytical methods. One 
conclusion may therefore be that strategic cultures are generally slow to change and 
consequently exhibit a persistence and continuity over time, but that ideas, discourse, norms and 
the influence of new generations play a significant role. An emphasis on these factors may further 
our understanding of the processes that induce change in strategic cultures.[59] 
Finally, the impact of transnational non-state terrorist actors and whether strategic cultural 
research can illuminate their actions is also crucial to this research endeavor. Much has been 
accomplished already in responding to the challenges the post-9/11 world has engendered. This 
should not be overlooked, but the world does not stand still and neither do strategic cultures. In a 
globalized and technologically dynamic environment where material and ideational forces are at 
work this could be the key to developing future policies. As George and Bennett have suggested 
what is needed are: 
More discriminating 'actor-specific' behavioral models…that recognize that an adversary is not a 
unitary actor, but often includes a number of individuals who may differ in important ways in their 
analysis and opportunities to be considered in deciding policy. Similarly, the particular rationality 
of an opponent may reflect values, beliefs, perceptions, and judgments of acceptable risk that 
differ from those of the side that is attempting to influence its behavior. Simple assumptions that 
one is dealing with rational or unitary actors may be particularly dangerous when one is trying to 
deal with non-state actors, such as warlords, terrorists, or rivals in civil wars.[60] 
Further research could therefore seek to integrate the knowledge gleaned into threat 
assessments; and analyses of trends in strategic cultures of all types could seek to identify 
changes occurring over time, be forewarned when new challenges emerge and be as well 
prepared as pragmatically feasible to respond when the time comes.  
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